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TRANSPARENCY AND FAIRNESS IN MACHINE
LEARNING APPLICATIONS
By Jim Shook, Robyn Smith, and Alex Antonio
Businesses and consumers increasingly use artificial intelligence (“AI”)—
and specifically machine learning (“ML”) applications—in their daily work.
ML is often used as a tool to help people perform their jobs more efficiently,
but increasingly it is becoming a technology that may eventually replace
humans in performing certain functions.1 An AI recently beat humans in a
reading comprehension test,2 and there is an ongoing race to replace human
drivers with self-driving cars and trucks. Tomorrow there is the potential for
much more—as AI is even learning to build its own AI.3
As the use of AI technologies continues to expand, and especially as ma-
chines begin to act more autonomously with less human intervention, impor-
tant questions arise about how we can best integrate this new technology into
our society, particularly within our legal and compliance frameworks. The
questions raised are different from those that we have already addressed with
other technologies because AI is different. Most previous technologies func-
tioned as a tool, operated by a person, and for legal purposes we could usually
hold that person responsible for actions that resulted from using that tool. For
example, an employee who used a computer to send a discriminatory or de-
famatory email could not have done so without the computer, but the em-
ployee would still be held responsible for creating the email.
While AI can function as merely a tool, it can also be designed to act after
making its own decisions, and in the future, will act even more autonomously.
As AI becomes more autonomous, it will be more difficult to determine
who—or what—is making decisions and taking actions, and determining the
basis and responsibility for those actions. These are the challenges that must
be overcome to ensure AI’s integration for legal and compliance purposes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses mainly on reinforcement-learning techniques
using ML algorithms as a subset of the larger field of artificial intelli-
gence. AI is “the broader concept of machines being able to carry out
tasks in a way that we would consider ‘smart[;]’” while ML is “a cur-
rent application of AI based around the idea that we should really just
be able to give machines access to data and let them learn for
themselves.”4
AI and ML are increasingly used in ways that have a direct impact
on people in the real (physical) world:
• AI is used to make decisions on whether to extend credit to indi-
viduals with very little (if any) human involvement beyond setup
and deployment;5
• AI is used to review and monitor communications and activities
by employees in some workplaces, and can “flag” an individual’s
conduct as anomalous or even bad;6
4. Bernard Marr, What Is The Difference Between Artificial Intelligence And Ma-
chine Learning?, Forbes (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:24 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/20180206
045712/https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/12/06/what-is-the-difference-
between-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/.
5. Machine Learning in Credit Scoring, TIETO (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.tieto
.com/news/machine-learning-in-credit-scoring [https://perma.cc/6MC2-DRRU].
6. Oscar Williams-Grut, Goldman Sachs and UBS monitor traders with a machine
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• AI is increasingly being used as a “chatbot” to autonomously
interact with customers, creating a savings of potentially $8 bil-
lion by 2022;7
• Amazon uses ML in inventory optimization and product
recommendations;8
• AI can review resumes and other job application information to
determine whether an individual would be appropriate for a job,
even making decisions on which candidates should not be ap-
proved for a next step in the hiring process;9 and
• a ML tool called COMPAS has been used to make recommen-
dations on criminal sentencing. Today, these are only recom-
mendations which are reviewed by a judge, but there are
concerns about racial bias, and the impact and weight of the rec-
ommendation is largely unknown.10
With a little imagination, it is easy to imagine how these technolo-
gies could be used even more extensively and autonomously in the
future:
• a ML “supervisor” that reviews communications, work product
and other factors to determine if employees should be eligible
for promotions, demoted for poor productivity or given raises or
bonuses;11
• an autonomous “chatbot” that communicates with a customer to
answer questions about products or services, makes recommen-
dations, completes sales transactions and otherwise handles ac-
tivities that would traditionally be performed by a human;12
• an “eDiscovery Bot” which could understand a legal case and
autonomously collect legally relevant electronically stored infor-
mation based upon its own experience;13 and
7. Jennifer Kite-Powell, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Set to




8. Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Business of Artificial Intelligence,
HARV. BUS. REV., https://hbr.org/cover-story/2017/07/the-business-of-artificial-intelli-
gence [https://perma.cc/L4RU-AWVU] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).
9. Jennifer Alserver, How AI is Changing Your Job Hunt, FORTUNE (May 19,
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/05/19/ai-changing-jobs-hiring-recruiting/ [https://perma
.cc/92BD-EM2Z].
10. Aaron M. Bornstein, Are Algorithms Building the New Infrastructure of Ra-
cism, NAUTILUS (Dec. 21, 2017), http://nautil.us/issue/55/trust/are-algorithms-building-
the-new-infrastructure-of-racism [https://perma.cc/UEA5-8AWR].
11. Ted Greenwald, How AI is Transforming the Workplace, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
10, 2017, 6:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-ai-is-transforming-the-work-
place-1489371060 [https://perma.cc/6S6X-3P9Y].
12. Michael Quoc, 11 Examples of Conversational Commerce and Chatbots,
CHATBOTS MAG. (May 31, 2016), https://chatbotsmagazine.com/11-examples-of-con-
versational-commerce-57bb8783d332 [https://perma.cc/7QBZ-UZMR].
13. Jim Shook, The E-Discovery Bots Are Coming: Machine Learning in Preserva-
tion and Collection, LAW.COM (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/al-
mID/1202778606612/ [https://perma.cc/8KBU-8TYZ].
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• a fleet of AI vehicles to replace the trucking industry and the
largest automobiles on the road are now driverless.14
ML used in these scenarios will be challenging for legal and compli-
ance reasons. The decision-making process with ML is usually inscru-
table, and even the creators may not understand how decisions are
being made.15 Thus, when situations arise that require a review of the
decision process, whether for legal, compliance, or regulatory pur-
poses, there is little or no information for that review, and no person
or thing who can answer typical questions.16
Traditionally, people handled these processes, and those individuals
were responsible—legally and under compliance frameworks—for
their activities. If problems needed to be resolved or investigated,
people could be interviewed, their communications could be re-
viewed, they could be required to testify under oath or there were
documents or witnesses to provide additional information. These in-
formation sources could be used to investigate any concerns or issues,
and ultimately hold the right people accountable or exonerate them
for acting appropriately.
The same processes are not available when ML capabilities are be-
ing used, at least not in their current forms. Decisions by ML applica-
tions are made generally on a “black box” basis, usually with a very
limited or no understanding of how the decisions were made.17 There
may not even be information logs or other data to help review the
process of how decisions were made—just the inputs and the final out-
put.18 As an example, a review of an ML hiring application may un-
cover information about a candidate, including name and address,
school and training information, prior jobs and certifications, etc., and
then a decision on whether to hire the candidate.19 What is missing is
any information about the basis for that decision—why was an offer of
employment made to one candidate and not to another?
This process is opaque than ever with traditional software, where
source code could be reviewed to determine the actual algorithm or
14. Jonathan Vanian, In 10 Years, Artificial Intelligence Will Transform Trucking,
Says Otto Exec, FORTUNE (Mar. 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/27/uber-otto-
artificial-intelligence-truck-driving/ [https://perma.cc/QV3W-T75H].




17. Colin Lewis & Dagmar Monett, AI & Machine Learning Black Boxes: The




19. Thomas Claburn, Mysterious Algorithms, Black-Box AI Recruiters are Binning
our Résumés, REG. (Oct. 17, 2016, 9:45 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/17/
hr_sw_for_job_applicants_lacking/ [https://perma.cc/YNV8-YHZD].
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process of decision making.20 Source code for a ML application
mainly implements a learning function, which can be very similar
(possibly even the same) for two programs with very different goals—
because the algorithm is only used to learn from the data sets that are
supplied for training. Thus, the only detailed information about how
an ML application actually functions is hidden in the numerical
weights and paths that have been assigned to hundreds, thousands or
possibly even millions of nodes that make up the ML model—infor-
mation that is opaque to humans.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND MACHINE LEARNING
ML applications are not just a different type of software but are
significantly different from how applications have traditionally been
written in programming languages.21To fully understand the new chal-
lenges ML presents, it must be understood that ML “represents a fun-
damentally different approach to creating software: The machine
learns from examples, rather than being explicitly programmed for a
particular outcome.”22
A. Traditional Code
In a traditional computer program, an application is written in com-
puter code, usually called a language, to perform a certain task. The
program includes instructions, or code, that implement rules or algo-
rithms to perform different processes or logical operations, which may
change depending on the inputs and will produce different results.
For example, if a credit company developed a program to evaluate
an applicant’s ability to repay a loan, it might rate applicants based
upon a total “score” earned from work and credit history, salary his-
tory, the value of a home, bank and credit balances and other infor-
mation related to the capability to repay. One rule might be to give an
applicant points based upon the salary earned in the previous year. In
pseudo-code,23 instructions to implement this rule might be:
If Applicant.Salary > 200,000 then score+=10
Elsif Applicant.Salary > 100,000 then score+=7
Elsif Applicant.Salary > 50,000 then score+=4
20. Brynjolfsson & McAfee, supra note 8.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. “Pseudocode is an informal high-level description of the operating principle of
a computer program or other algorithm. It uses the structural conventions of a normal
programming language, but is intended for human reading rather than machine read-
ing.” Pseudocode, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudocode [https://per
ma.cc/G32R-BUEP] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
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In natural language, this implements a rule that an applicant with a
salary greater than $200,000 would receive ten additional points; a sal-
ary greater than $100,000 (and up to $200,000) would receive seven
additional points; and one with a salary greater than $50,000 (and up
to $100,000) would receive four additional points. Applicants with sal-
aries less than $50,000 would not receive any additional points.
The importance of this example is that the rules are explicit in the
source code—and must be so that the computer can execute them.
Programmers can readily review the source code to understand how
the program works, and to make changes or updates.
B. Machine Learning
The workings of a ML application, built upon a neural network, are
more complex:
You can’t just look inside a deep neural network to see how it
works. A network’s reasoning is embedded in the behavior of
thousands of simulated neurons, arranged into dozens or even hun-
dreds of intricately interconnected layers. The neurons in the first
layer each receive an input, like the intensity of a pixel in an image,
and then perform a calculation before outputting a new signal.
These outputs are fed, in a complex web, to the neurons in the next
layer, and so on, until an overall output is produced. Plus, there is a
process known as back-propagation that tweaks the calculations of
individual neurons in a way that lets the network learn to produce a
desired output.24
ML takes a very different approach than traditional computer code.
The code for a ML application is mainly the code for its learning al-
gorithm.25 This algorithm is used to “teach” the application using data
sets that are provided to it.26 In fact, ML code may not vary much
between applications that are completely unrelated; the code for a ML
application to recommend criminal sentences could be very similar to
code which evaluates credit applications.27 The main difference be-
tween applications applying the same ML algorithm is the data used
to learn, and after the learning process has been completed, the un-
derlying structure of neurons and weights.
Returning to the credit example, a ML application would start with
a learning algorithm and data sets consisting of historical loan and
repayment information. This data would include the same inputs that
we described before in the source code example (e.g., salary, history,
24. Knight, supra note 15.
25. See David Lhr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars
Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 688–90 (2017).
26. Id.
27. Catherine Dong, The Evolution of Machine Learning, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 8,
2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/08/the-evolution-of-machine-learning/ [https://
perma.cc/648S-CCUZ].
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etc.), additional information related to the applicant (e.g., home ad-
dress, zip code), and the outcomes from past decisions made for those
applicants such as repayment history, defaults, etc. All that informa-
tion is fed to the ML application, which then applies its algorithm to
learn—determining which combination of inputs are important to a
final score and weighing them (and adjusting those weights) as it con-
tinues through the learning process. After training is complete, the
state of the neural network is evaluated with a separate data set, and
once the results are within an acceptable test range, it can be used.
C. Potential Legal and Compliance Problems
People cannot normally understand what is happening in the ML
decision-making process—there is no algorithm to follow showing
how input information is being used. For example, even with dozens
of inputs, depending on the training data, it is possible that a neural
network could “learn”—on its own—to deny a pool of credit appli-
cants based solely upon gender or race. Worse, if this did occur it
would be difficult to identify. In fact, “subtle biases in training data
can utterly change a neural network’s personality—an issue that will
become increasingly significant as AI increasingly comes to rely upon
big data.”28
A real-world example shows this problem in action. A ML applica-
tion trained to assist on diagnosing patients with pneumonia “learned”
from its data that asthma sufferers were at low risk for death from
contracting pneumonia, and could safely be sent home for further
care. Later, people evaluating the outcomes from the application de-
termined that data fed to the algorithm had not accounted for the fact
that the asthma sufferers had better outcomes because they had been
immediately sent to intensive care.29
Taking a closer look at the differences between traditional code and
ML further highlights the difficulty with identifying the problem. As-
sume an application is being developed to evaluate candidates for a
job in a large organization. Traditionally, this position has been filled
mainly by males—thus the data set used for training consists mostly of
males. Across a large data set, candidate qualifications should be dis-
tributed across a bell curve—a few will have performed exceptionally,
a few poorly, and the bulk within a standard deviation or two of aver-
age. If there are only a handful of female candidates represented in
the data set, and they are rated exceptionally well, the system could
learn to tie the input of female gender to better performance and
28. Ilan Moscovitz, Artificial Intelligence’s “Holy Grail” Victory, MOTLEY FOOL
(Dec. 31, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/12/31/artificial-intelli-
gences-holy-grail-victory.aspx [https://perma.cc/L7QA-YYKX].
29. Anastassia Fedyk, How to Tell if Machine Learning Can Solve Your Business
Problem, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 25, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/how-to-tell-if-ma-
chine-learning-can-solve-your-business-problem [https://perma.cc/2SNF-SHUB].
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males to average or poor performance. Due to the potentially biased
training data, the application could learn to discount or discard all
other data and simply select candidates based upon their gender.
If the organization used a standard software package to make a sim-
ilar decision, the encoding of an algorithm to evaluate candidates
based upon gender would be evident in the source code. Depending
on the language, the source code could look like this
If $Gender == “Male” then HiringScore:= 0
While this code would not be evident to any outsiders (because source
code is not generally available for review), it would be easy to locate
for anyone who knew to look.
ML, however, has no parallel which would enable anyone to iden-
tify this issue. The only difference between a “fair” and “unfair” neu-
ral network would be in the weights assigned to the different neurons,
and perhaps in the overall structure of the neural network. The com-
plexity of these networks, particularly deep learning networks, means
that there is simply no straightforward way to review the weights and
determine how the data inputs are being used to make a final decision.
Overall, the implications for this opaqueness of ML can be impor-
tant for legal and compliance purposes because:
• There is often no way to explain how a decision was reached;
• there is little or no code to inspect which can assist in that
understanding;
• the ML learns on its own, meaning that it selects and weighs the
factors that are used in making its decisions. This could be prob-
lematic if it uses factors such as race, gender or socioeconomic
status, which might be illegal, unethical or against company pol-
icy; and
• with decisions made by a machine instead of a person, there is
no way to instill a sense of ethics, code of conduct or to incorpo-
rate other compliance tools.
These types of problems will be very difficult to uncover and could
work improperly for years before being discovered.
III. AI USE AND THE LAW
The opaque and sometimes mysterious way ML functions, and its
ability for more autonomous use, creates categories of legal issues and
concerns requiring a proper approach to resolve in a fair and efficient
manner.
It is difficult to predict how AI may challenge existing legal and
regulatory frameworks, in part due to the lack of regulations acknowl-
edging AI and the lack of case law applying existing regulations to this
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technology.30 With the exception of a few regulations on drone use,
the United States has yet to determine which agency or institution is
best equipped to govern the use of AI, as it now has a presence in
most industries.31 Understanding if and how AI must comply with cur-
rent regulations touches a variety of legal fields from basic tort liabil-
ity to employment discrimination and basic constitutional protections.
Yet at a high level, the difficulties will be caused by certain character-
istics of AI: the lack of transparency; the lack of repeatability and con-
sistency; and autonomy.
A. Lack of Transparency
The methods by which ML applications are trained and deliver re-
sults makes it difficult to obtain an explanation about how a specific
result was computed. In the credit score example above, an applicant
may receive a score of X, but there is no information regarding how
individual factors applied to yield that score. Another candidate with
slightly different input characteristics—say a different zip code or sal-
ary information—might produce the same or a very different result.
Regardless, there is no way to query the application to determine the
reasons for the score, or even for the difference between two scores.
This opacity creates problems with transparency. Without trans-
parency – in this context, the ability to explain how a result was
achieved—it is difficult to trust the underlying system and to know
whether appropriate, legally and ethically proper, and accurate crite-
ria are being used in the decision-making process. Opacity creates
problems with several existing laws and obligations.
1. EU General Data Protection Regulation
In some situations, the ability to explain a decision may be explicitly
required. Many commentators believe that the upcoming General
Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”),32 requires organizations to
provide detailed information about automated decision-making—the
so-called “right to explanation.”33 This requirement includes “mean-
30. Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Chal-
lenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 378 (2016).
31. Id. at 356.
32. See generally Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC 2018 O.J. (L 119).
33. Article 15 EU GDPR “Right of Access by the Data Subject”, PRIVAZY PLAN,
http://www.privacy-regulation.eu/en/15.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) (stating the
data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller confirmation as to
whether or not personal data concerning him or her are being processed, and, where
that is the case, access to the personal data and the following information: . . . (h) the
existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article
22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic
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ingful information about the logic involved” in the decision.34 Because
the regulation is not yet enforceable there are no decisions to help
guide the level of detail required. But if the requirement is more than
specifying how an application was trained, it will be difficult for orga-
nizations to meet these requirements with most ML applications.
2. Litigation and Discovery or Disclosure
Even when transparency is not legally mandated as a part of using
an ML application, if a dispute arises, the lack of transparency will
create difficulties in the litigation process.35
In the U.S. litigation process, parties are entitled to information
about the matters involved in a controversy:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the
scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery re-
garding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, consid-
ering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount
in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information,
the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving
the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed dis-
covery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of
discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.36
A party must preserve evidence, including electronically stored infor-
mation (“ESI”), which is relevant to the issues of the case. Depending
on other factors, such as relevance, proportionality and privilege, they
may also have to produce this ESI.
Discovery is problematic when it involves ML. As previously noted,
unlike with a witness who can testify or be deposed, there may not be
any logs, code or other information that can help to explain a decision
made by an ML application. There will be few categories of ESI to
preserve, and a party may have to preserve and produce the ML appli-
cation itself.37
3. Use of Prohibited Information
Many federal and state laws, particularly in the employment area,
prohibit discrimination based upon specific characteristics or prohib-
ited classes. If ML is used by organizations within their hiring, recruit-
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such process-
ing for the data subject).
34. Id.
35. Although the U.S. has the broadest discovery requirements, this issue may
create problems in other countries such as disclosure in the United Kingdom.
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
37. The algorithm and machine learning application could be confidential and/or
proprietary. But this should not stop production when it is critical to the issues in a
case, and the concerns can be covered by a confidentiality order under FED. R. CIV. P.
26(c)(1)(g).
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ing, retention and other employee-related workflows, it may be
impossible for those organizations to know whether improper infor-
mation is being considered in violation of certain laws. For example:
• Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimina-
tion based upon race, color, religion, sex or national origin.38
• The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 protects
against employment discrimination based on an individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.39
• The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 extended
protected class status to individuals barring discrimination based
on age.40
If an ML application has access to prohibited data during training, it
may be impossible to prove that such information was not used and
did not play any role in a decision. But even excluding such data from
a training set may not be a sufficient safeguard: data about other activ-
ities or traits can serve as a proxy for prohibited information. For ex-
ample, shopping patterns can be used to identify age, gender and
socio-economic status.41
However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that due process is
not violated by the opaqueness of the algorithms used by ML and
could be used in criminal sentencing cases to determine if an offender
would likely offend again,42 even if the algorithm may have taken race
into account.43 The supreme court refused a writ of certiorari to ap-
peal the Wisconsin decision and additional concerns related to due
process remain unanswered.44
4. Compliance
While not strictly a legal requirement, the concept that a decision is
fair may be necessary for corporate values and compliance, marketing,
shareholders, and other concerns, and can be difficult to establish
when there is no transparency. For example, the concept of fairness in
38. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
39. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
40. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602.
41. Finale Doshi-Velez et al, Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of
Explanation, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Nov. 3, 2017), available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3064761.
42. The limitations on this decision, such as a determination that the algorithm
was being used as one of many inputs and the decision ultimately left to the judge, will
be explored more fully in section D(a)(i), infra.
43. Garry G. Mathiason et al., Litter on Legal Compliance Solutions for the Trans-
formation of the Workplace Through Robotic Artificial Intelligence, and Automation,
2017 SZ002 A.L.I.–A.B.A. 2823 § 1.2.
44. Michelle Liu, Supreme Court refuses to hear Wisconsin predictive crime assess-
ment case, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June 26, 2017, 10:47 AM), https://www.jsonline
.com/story/news/crime/2017/06/26/supreme-court-refuses-hear-wisconsin-predictive-
crime-assessment-case/428240001/ [https://perma.cc/Q3KY-9RXA].
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a hiring context would likely imply that a decision regarding a candi-
date was: (a) well-founded, for example that applicants selected for
jobs truly are qualified, and those that are rejected lacked necessary
skills, experience, or other characteristics; and (b) not based upon fac-
tors or biases that while not prohibited, probably should not be con-
sidered (such as sexual orientation).45 Similarly, a shopping
recommendation bot might violate corporate values by making rec-
ommendations based upon ethnicity or economic status, or just infor-
mation considered to be private, even if those recommendations made
algorithmic sense.46
Interestingly, these non-legal requirements can become legal issues
if ML undermines specific representations made by an organization.
Many organizations make broad statements on their websites and
elsewhere about how they conduct business. If their actions run con-
trary to their representations, the FTC could view this practice as un-
fair under its broad Section 5 powers.47 For example, in 2011 the FTC
investigated Google for allegedly preferring its own products in web-
site search results. Although some of the results could have been pre-
ferred by programmers, at least some of the results were driven by
ML algorithms. These algorithms could have been trained with data
skewing in favor of Google, which would have been more difficult to
ascertain than traditional code showing Google favoritism. The FTC
ultimately took no action against Google.
B. Lack of Repeatability and Consistency
Another inherent and useful capability of ML is that it can continue
to learn and improve, using data from the feedback loop of its deci-
sions. For example, if a candidate selected by the hiring application
turns out to be a poor choice, that data can be used to further train the
application. If the same candidate reapplies six months later, the ap-
45. In one recent study, a machine learning application could predict sexual orien-
tation based solely on photographs. At its best, the ML was 91% accurate, compared
to 61% accuracy for humans. Bernard Marr, The AI That Predicts Your Sexual Orien-
tation Simply By Looking At Your Face, Forbes (Sep. 28, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/09/28/the-ai-that-predicts-your-sexual-orien-
tation-simply-by-looking-at-your-face/#67a4f9c43456 [https://perma.cc/XP3T-LV2G].
46. In a well-publicized matter, Target determined that a high school student was
pregnant based upon her shopping habits, and sent her coupons for pre-natal vita-
mins. The fact that Target knew about and used the pregnancy for marketing, before
she had told her family, caused a public relations problem. See e.g., Charles Duhigg,
How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc/U4WA-
XY5R].
47. “The basic consumer protection statute enforced by the [FTC] is Section 5(a)
of the FTC Act, which provides that ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affect-
ing commerce . . . are . . . declared unlawful.’” A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/
B8JN-VAFK] (last updated July 2008).
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plication may rate him substantially different than the first time be-
cause it has learned that certain qualifications may not be as
important to success as originally calculated.
However, this constant improvement process creates problems with
repeatability and consistency. While every organization has an interest
in improving its applications, there can be problems when a decision
made today will be reversed tomorrow after an update to the
algorithm.
1. Compliance
Mainly, the lack of consistency may present problems with compli-
ance and corporate oversight and culture. For example, an organiza-
tion might be working to instill a corporate culture that places the
customer “first.” In deploying a chatbot to improve the speed and effi-
ciency of customer service, this core value would be difficult to imple-
ment. Further, even with a successful initial implementation, the ML’s
ability to learn to become more efficient may help it to realize that
certain customer characteristics, or specific issues, can seldom be re-
solved. In its quest for efficiency, it could learn to spend less time on
these issues, leaving the customer unsatisfied.
Many issues in this area may not be manifested until ML is being
used in a more autonomous manner. For example, an organization
which values its long-term relationships with suppliers—or perhaps
prefers a specific partner characteristic such as MBE/WBE busi-
nesses—could lose these preferences as an ML learns that other char-
acteristics such as price or shipping times are more valuable to
achieving its established goals.
2. Discovery and Disclosure
The challenges related to repeatability and consistency can also cre-
ate legal issues. As detailed in Section D(A)(2), above, parties in liti-
gation may have a duty to preserve evidence, including ESI, that is
relevant to the issues in a case. This duty of preservation generally
triggers upon reasonable anticipation of litigation (subject to concerns
about proportionality, relevance, privilege, etc.).48
In the context of a continuously learning application, legal hold
preservation could prove to be difficult and fraught with risk. Without
pre-established procedures, an update to an ML could be irreversible,
and there would be no way to re-run the application with the same
48. The obligation to preserve electronically stored information requires reasona-
ble and good faith efforts to retain information that is expected to be relevant to
claims or defenses in reasonably anticipated or pending litigation. However, it is un-
reasonable to expect parties to take every conceivable step or disproportionate steps
to preserve each instance of relevant electronically stored information. The Sedona
Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Address-
ing Electronic Document Production, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, Principle 5, 38–40 (2018).
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parameters to achieve the same result as that which triggered the liti-
gation. In fact, in many cases it would be likely that the application
could have already updated itself before litigation was anticipated,
with the ability to review and evaluate the decision-making process
gone forever. Further, if the ML is not generating logs or leaving be-
hind other information explaining its decisions or interim calculations,
there will be little information to add to the discovery process.
C. Autonomy
An ML’s ability to act more autonomously—more like an indepen-
dent human—can also produce a multitude of legal issues.
1. Contracts
There are many advantages to enabling an AI to enter into a con-
tract, for both the seller and buyer. Commercial benefits include
quicker transactions, more sophisticated decision making, reduction in
clerical errors, and cost cutting.49 However, both the seller employing
the AI and the buyer interacting with the AI must ensure that the
transaction is legally binding.50
Thus, as ML applications act more autonomously, the ability to
enter into agreements51—and the valid scope of those agreements—
will likely become a more significant legal issue. At least one com-
mentator determined that an AI cannot enter into an agreement be-
cause it is not a natural person, but agency, apparent authority, or
even an AI serving as a “device” of an organization can suffice to
make the agreement binding.52 Today, much of online commerce is
driven without human interaction on the seller side and is normally
subject to express terms and conditions provided by the selling site.
However, potential legal issues will grow as AI becomes more in-
volved in negotiating actual terms and when there are AIs on both
sides of the agreement negotiating those terms. Can there be a meet-
ing of the minds if there are no human minds involved in creating the
terms and conditions of a contract? Should human operators of AI be
bound by contracts that they take no direct part in negotiating—and
what if the negotiations are outside the intended scope? Questions
like these and other policy determinations will need to be answered
49. Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 25, 29 (1996).
50. Id.
51. The classical formation of a contract requires: (1) two or more parties to the
contract; (2) the two parties are in agreement; (3) the parties must intend to create a
legal relation that promises each side to perform to the contract because of the con-
tract; (4) the promises of each party must be supported by consideration. Id. at 30,
citing CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:  A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OB-
LIGATION (1981).
52. Id. Or the AI could be a “device” of the company. See State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Bockhorst, 453 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1972).
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when determining if contract law needs to be modified when dealing
with future AI.
2. Intent and Consent
Some laws require a finding of intent that may be difficult to con-
ceptualize when a human is not involved. For example, the common
law claim of tortious interference with contract requires, among other
elements, knowledge of a pre-existing agreement and a finding of in-
tent to act.53 Similarly, many states require a human-based standard
for an award of punitive damages. For example, in Arizona punitive
damages require an “evil mind”: an intent to injure or wrongful con-
duct motivated by spite or ill will.54
Similarly, an autonomous AI might also collect and store locally re-
corded data, either in efforts for providing auditability or in continu-
ing to learn and improve. Regardless, this activity could invoke state
and federal wiretapping laws.55 Most current regulations require con-
sent from parties to be videotaped or recorded and individuals near
certain types of AI may be unaware that they are being recorded. This
activity comes with stiff legal fines for the party that uses such record-
ings, but an AI employer may be unaware that this information is be-
ing taken in or used.56 Further, if the AI has acted autonomously in
making the recording, it may be difficult to determine whether and
how existing laws apply (since classically there may be only one actual
“party” to the conversation and no other human party triggers, hears,
or uses the recording) and how and when consent requirements could
be met. These standards of intent and other human-focused require-
ments lack clarity in their applicability to machine-based actors.
IV. A WAY FORWARD
AI presents many novel legal and compliance challenges. Some sug-
gest that the problems should be solved technologically—that AI can
be designed to explain its decisions, and that logs and audit informa-
tion can help with the explanation process.57 Those improvements
could happen soon or in the future. However, it is likely that not all
applications will have these capabilities, and that we will create new
forms of AI that advance quickly and lack such capabilities.  In addi-
53. Tortious interference with contract requires proof of four elements: (1) that a
valid contract existed, (2) that defendant had knowledge of the contract, (3) that de-
fendant acted intentionally and improperly, and (4) that plaintiff was injured by the
defendant’s actions. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, LEGAL INFO.
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intentional_interference_with_contractual_re
lations [https://perma.cc/MU2D-8344] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).
54. E.g., Linthicum v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 679 (Ariz. 1986).
55. Mathiason, supra note 43.
56. See id.
57. E.g., Doshi-Velez, supra note 41, at 12.
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tion, there are other issues previously described, such as intent, that
are difficult to interpret in an AI context.
Rather than rely on technological advancement, it is simpler and
more direct to look at well-developed law and legal theories to deter-
mine which can apply directly to the challenges presented by AI.
There are two distinct areas of concern: (1) assessing legal, regulatory
and other liability or responsibility for AI; and (2) determining how to
handle evidentiary and witness concerns when an AI holds the infor-
mation necessary for those processes.
A. Legal and Regulatory Liability and Responsibility
An organization deploying any form of AI should generally be re-
sponsible for the actions and decisions resulting from its use of AI
under the existing legal structure.58 However, because AI can be ap-
plied on so many different levels, and those capabilities are growing, a
continuum may be required for any analysis to determine responsibil-
ity. On one end of that continuum AI is being applied as a basic tool,
while at the other a fully autonomous AI is making its own decisions,
entering into agreements, and taking other independent actions.
1. AI as a Tool
In many situations, especially today, AI is acting merely as a tool to
provide humans with additional insights, efficiencies, or other capabil-
ities. A person is wielding that tool and is ultimately responsible for
any decisions, which are merely being informed by the tool.59 Exam-
ples abound, but these are situations where AI is perhaps reviewing
data and providing recommended scores for credit, job applicants, and
sentencing. The key factor here is that these are mere starting points
that are viewed and vetted by humans, and are simply factors in an
overall decision-making process.
In the COMPAS sentencing algorithm matter, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court held that due process is not violated by the opaqueness
of the algorithms used by ML and could be used in criminal sentenc-
ing cases to determine if an offender would likely offend again, even if
the algorithm may have taken race into account.60 However, the court
noted concerns and provided limits on the use of the algorithm, in-
cluding that “risk scores may not be used as the determinative fac-
tor”—essentially noting that COMPAS is permitted as a mere tool for
the judge to use in sentencing.61 The US Supreme Court refused a writ
58. David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial
Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 121 (2014).
59. Id.at 120–21.
60. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016); Mathiason, supra note 43.
61. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 768.
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of certiorari to appeal the Wisconsin decision and additional concerns
related to due process remain unanswered.62
Situations where AI is a tool are the most direct to handle from a
legal perspective—they should not require any changes to existing le-
gal approaches. An individual using the tool remains responsible for
any actions taken, just as with an employee who is using a computer
or a spreadsheet to help perform their day-to-day activities.
2. AI As An Independent Decision Maker
The next point to examine on the continuum is when AI is acting as
an independent decision maker in an overall process that includes
humans. This differs from the tool scenario because the AI is making
decisions, and the basis or reasoning for the decisions are typically
unknown to others using or relying upon those decisions.
Problems will arise when another member of an organization makes
a decision or takes action based upon the AI, and that individual is
not responsible for reviewing or questioning the AI decision. For ex-
ample, an AI may cull an employee applicant pool to a small group
for the next step, meaning that it made the decision to remove all
other applicants from the process.
This is a more difficult scenario than the tool situation previously
described. However, for policy and social reasons, it seems clear that
an organization must remain responsible for any decisions made by its
AI. If a poorly designed AI selects only male candidates from a pool,
creating a gender discrimination liability issue, the organization
should remain responsible for those actions under standard legal theo-
ries. The fact that a ML application—selected and used by the organi-
zation—is making decisions instead of a (human) employee should
not change the analysis.
V. AUTONOMOUS AI
An AI making decisions and undertaking further activity based on
those decisions requires a different approach, and common legal
frameworks will be more difficult to apply. An example is an online
credit application that is processed from start to finish without human
intervention. Today, there are generally humans involved at some
level of a review process, at least for larger and more sophisticated
loans such as mortgages and commercial loans or lines of credit. But
as confidence and faith grow in AI, and business models transform,
this may no longer be the case.
For legal responsibility and liability, a starting point is to treat an
autonomous AI as an employee. The doctrine of respondeat superior
holds an employer liable “for torts committed by employees while act-
62. Liu, supra note 44.
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ing within the scope of their employment.”63 Since the AI is acting on
behalf of the employer, replacing activities normally performed by an
employee, the employer should similarly be liable for the results of
the AI’s activities. Although current AI technology can usually be rec-
ognized as a tool of an organization, as previously described, there
may be times in which AI is better classified as an agent of a person or
an organization and respondeat superior is better suited in determin-
ing liability.64
However, even respondeat superior is merely a starting point and
there are situations that present more difficult scenarios. What if the
AI works very differently than expected—should the employing or-
ganization be liable for all actions? Microsoft released an AI bot in
2016 that was to learn how to “tweet” —send messages on the Twitter
platform.65 Within a day, the bot had learned some bad and appar-
ently racist tendencies.  The result was not Microsoft’s intent, and it
shut down the bot. But if the bot had caused actionable legal harm,
such as slandering an individual, should Microsoft have been responsi-
ble? Microsoft did not intend this type of activity and it does not ap-
pear to be within the course and scope of the bot’s intended
“employment.” Should Microsoft be permitted to argue course and
scope as a defense to a legal claim; or should Microsoft, which was
solely responsible for the underlying code and the decision to unleash
this bot on the public, be prohibited from arguing that defense? After
all, Microsoft chose the learning algorithms and the environment for
the data set to enable learning.
Compliance can present similar challenges for autonomous AI.
Most companies have a code of conduct that employees must follow.
What if the actions of an AI violate that code? Since the AI probably
has not pledged to follow the code, should it be disciplined as an em-
ployee—and what form would that discipline take? Perhaps some
consideration might be given to disciplining the employees responsi-
ble for deploying and monitoring the AI.  However, that strategy
could be overly punitive and might preclude people from actively
working on such projects. One way to ensure compliance measures
are met by AI is for corporations to only utilize AI that is able to
explain the actions that it takes.66
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
64. Joel Espelien, The Brave New World of Robot Law, L. PRAC. TODAY (Jan. 14,
2016), http://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/the-brave-new-world-of-robot-law/
[https://perma.cc/BTR9-WKZS].
65. Rob Price, Microsoft is Deleting Its AI Chatbot’s Incredibly Racist Tweets, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 24, 2016, 7:31 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/microsoft-deletes-
racist-genocidal-tweets-from-ai-chatbot-tay-2016-3 [https://perma.cc/ASM8-EC6E].
66. Guruduth Banavar, Learning to Trust Artificial Intelligence Systems: Accounta-
bility, Compliance and Ethics in the Age of Smart Machines, IBM 4 (2016), www.re-
search.ibm.com/software/IBMResearch/multimedia/AIEthics_Whitepaper.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/3D8N-VLNB].
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A final area of interest in autonomous applications is with establish-
ing intent as an element of a cause of action or to establish punitive
damages. If an AI application is inscrutable, then without evidence
that project members intended a result—which is only circumstantial
evidence of intent by the AI—there is no evidence to shed any light
on the question of intent. This seems to be an unfair position for an
aggrieved party, and would wrongly reward organizations that do not
move forward with efforts to have AI explain its actions. Perhaps a
better solution in determining intent is to shift the burden of proof to
the party deploying the AI. This would encourage deploying parties to
generate logs and other information from the AI. Even without this
data, a deploying organization could be permitted to use design and
other deployment information to establish a lack of intent, which
should help to prevent unjust results. Regardless, shifting the burden
has the beneficial effect of forcing deploying parties to think more
about their logging and auditing processes, and to be more diligent in
their design and deployment.
A. AI As A Legal Entity
Some surmise that in the future, AI could function autonomously as
its own legal entity.67 With smart contracts, crypto currencies such as
Bitcoin and other processes that do not require actual human or phys-
ical intervention, an AI could, for example, act as an intermediary to
buy and resell goods, create and sell digital content, provide business
advice and number crunching capabilities.
Clearly similar scenarios are not anticipated by our current laws or
legal frameworks. What if the AI is sued by another party and it has
not been set up to receive service of process, respond to regulatory
inquiries or hire counsel? It is easy to envision a situation where a
default judgment is entered against the AI for failure to appear. How-
ever, this may not be the most equitable decision—and executing
against the judgment could prove difficult; there is no way for an AI
to respond to a debtor’s examination and even garnishments may be
impossible if cryptocurrencies are involved. Ultimately, the AI could
be run out of business if its servers are located and shut down, or if it
operates in a third-party cloud environment and fails to pay its bills.
However, applying existing laws seems to be the most sensible
route. If an AI is unleashed as an autonomous entity, then the AI
should suffer any pains that result from a failure to follow local laws
and regulations. This is akin to a situation where a (human) individual
operates a business and fails to respond to legal process or regulatory
inquiries—the only difference being that the human is making this de-
67. Matt Scherer, Is AI Personhood Already Possible Under Current Laws?, L. &
AI (May 14, 2017), http://www.lawandai.com/2017/05/14/is-ai-personhood-already-
possible-under-current-u-s-laws-dont-count-on-it-part-one/ [https://perma.cc/V6CN-
HSAR].
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cision by choice and the AI is unaware or incapable. In situations
where a significant amount of money is involved or there are other
important considerations, it is possible that the AI entity might be
placed into a form of receivership where advanced technical capabili-
ties could be used to operate and wind down the business under well-
established rules that are already in place.
B. AI in Discovery or Disclosure
A second difficult issue is determining how an organization can be
properly represented during discovery or a regulatory inquiry or in-
vestigation when an AI is at issue.
1. Discovery and Investigations
One problem with discovery when an AI is involved is that there
may be little or no useful information available during the process.
However, discovery generally does not obligate parties to create docu-
ments that do not exist.68 Thus, if an AI is not creating logs and does
not have other capabilities to explain its process, there may be little or
no evidence regarding its activities.
However, there are other options. The ML application itself—in-
cluding the neural network architecture and weights—may need to be
preserved and produced as ESI. The requesting party could poten-
tially gain information about the operation of the ML by changing
various input points and reviewing the results.69
Alternatively, the requesting party might issue a Rule 30(b)(6)70
deposition request mandating production of a witness who can testify
to the operation of the ML application. Whether this produces useful
information will be tested on a case-by-case basis, although the testi-
mony ordinarily is binding on the organization (in many jurisdictions,
the proffering organization can still contradict or impeach that testi-
mony).71 A more difficult case is when such information is truly not
reasonably available to the organization, as is likely to occur in many
AI matters regarding the process of how the AI made a decision. If
68. See e.g., Mervyn v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., No. 13 C 3587, 2015 WL 3649136
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2015).
69. See e.g., Doshi-Velez, supra note 41 (discussing how empirical evidence can be
used in interpreting AI decision making).
70. “In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or
private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other
entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.
The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or man-
aging agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it
may set out the matters on which each person designated will testify . . . . ” FED. R.
CIV. P. 30 (explaining Depositions by Oral Examination).
71. See generally ABA Section of Litigation Federal Practice Task Force Report On
Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions of Organizations, 17 (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2016_sac/written_materials/
2_30b6_aba_report.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/D67Q-L7XC].
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the lack of information is perceived as a failure to properly prepare,
sanctions could be ordered, or an organization could be barred from
presenting other evidence at trial.72
2. Witnesses and Representatives
Both in the present and the foreseeable future, an AI will not be
able to testify or respond directly to deposition or investigative ques-
tioning. In situations where the AI has acted more autonomously, this
may mean that there is very little or no evidence—other than the final
result—regarding the issues in question. This seems to be an unjust
result and one that could wrongly encourage organizations to mini-
mize information generated by their ML applications.
In situations where there is little or no information to explain ac-
tions related to the ML application, the best course may be to handle
the investigation similar to a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, as previously
discussed. The organization should be required to select a person or
persons with knowledge about the issues related to the AI and pro-
vide testimony (sworn where appropriate) on those issues. The organi-
zation should then be bound by this testimony and unable to provide
contrary information on the issues. This should not be a punishment,
but instead designed to encourage more transparency by ML-de-
ploying parties and to place the onus upon them where their ML cre-
ates a legal or regulatory issue.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
ML and artificial intelligence are rapidly growing in usage, and will
generate novel legal and regulatory issues and concerns as their use
becomes more prevalent. From a technology perspective, many are
calling for and working on capabilities that will explain how these
technologies are making decisions, much as we have traditionally been
able to ask a human whose role they are overtaking. However, there
are no guarantees that these capabilities will be developed or ac-
cepted. It is therefore prudent to consider how existing legal and regu-
latory frameworks can be applied to these technologies, based upon
their level of autonomy and societal interest in balancing their effi-
ciencies with the need for legal certainty.
72. Id.; See also QBE Ins. Corp. v. Jorda Enters., 277 F.R.D. 676, 688 (S.D. Fla.
2012) (“We don’t know” answer on 30(b)(6) topics may be binding and preclude fur-
ther testimony on that topic at trial).
